At the end of the year 2000, 6.88 million people in the UK (approximately 11.5% of the population) were covered by Private Medical Insurance (PMI). The aim of this paper is to examine possible determinants of the prevalence of PMI in England by using data from the British Household Panel Survey (BHPS) 1997-1999, the Department of Health and Laing's Healthcare Market Review 1999-2000. The BHPS is suitable for analyses of the determinants of PMI prevalence in England as individual respondents are followed over time, and thus changes that take place over time are incorporated in the analysis of associations between potential determinants and PMI coverage. The analysis also incorporates NHS waiting times data and data on potential supply-side factors. The results support the conclusion that income, age and political affiliation are key determinants of PMI prevalence. These variables repeatedly exhibit statistical significance in analyses of the determinants of PMI prevalence. The results also suggest that individuals reflect on prior information with regards to waiting times in deciding whether or not to purchase PMI cover. Also, the withdrawal of the tax subsidy to PMI subscribers over 60 years of age did not impact on their rate of withdrawal from PMI coverage relative to the rate amongst all PMI subscribers, but may have discouraged potential new subscribers.
Introduction
The UK National Health Service (NHS) Act of 1946 was based on the state having a collective responsibility for the provision of comprehensive health care, which was to be available, without cost, to the entire population. Despite this, privately supplied medical treatments have become a strong feature of the provision of health services. It has been estimated that by 1986, the private sector was carrying out 16% of all elective surgery undertaken on UK residents. 1 In 1996-97, 14.1% of elective hospital care in England and Wales was provided in private hospitals 2 and 25 private medical insurers were offering coverage in the United Kingdom. As of the late 1990s, there were approximately 230 independent medical hospitals in the United Kingdom. 3 The majority of independent care is purchased through private medical insurance. In 1997/98, 81% of patients in England and Wales paid for care in an independent hospital through private medical insurance (PMI). 4 At the end of the year 2000, 6.88 million people in the UK (approximately 11.5% of the population) were covered by PMI and the value of the PMI market was estimated at £2.45 billion, 5 4.5% of the estimated year 2000/2001 budget for the NHS of £54.2 billion. 6 The aim of this paper is to examine possible determinants of the prevalence of private medical insurance in England. That is, to shed light on the factors which encourage individuals to purchase private health insurance, despite the availability of care from the NHS. Using data from the British Household Panel Survey (BHPS) 1997-1999, the Department of Health and Laing's Healthcare Market Review 1999-2000, potential determinants of the uptake of PMI are examined.
The BHPS includes extensive data relating to PMI and several factors thought to impact upon the decision to purchase PMI. The panel nature of the survey allows households to be followed over the years for which data on PMI subscription are available. The BHPS is a rich source of data being used for the first time to add evidence to the determinants of PMI prevalence. Our analysis also incorporates data on inpatient and outpatient waiting times estimated at the health authority level (provided by the NHS Waiting Times Team), as well as data on the availability of private acute care beds, at the regional level (taken from Laing's Healthcare Market Review 1999 Review -2000 and estimates of the regional distribution of physicians working in the private health care sector (provided by the Work Force Statistics Branch of the Department of Health). The results add new evidence to other empirical analyses of what factors determine the size of the private medical insurance market in England.
Trends in Private Medical Insurance prevalence
The prevalence of PMI grew dramatically between 1985 and 1990 , with the number of subscribers increasing by almost 30% during this period. 7 The prevalence rate of PMI at the end of the year 2000 was 11.5%. 5 Since 1988, Laing and Buisson, in their annual review of the PMI market, have differentiated between individually purchased PMI and PMI purchased by employers on behalf of their employees. The number of subscribers covered through a employer paid plan has increased by approximately 23% since 1990, while during the same period, the number of subscribers who were either paying individually or as employees (as partial payment of a company plan) declined by about 6%. 5 At the end of 2000, 66.5% of PMI subscribers were in plans fully paid for by their employer (see Figure 1 ). 5 Between 1980 and 1989, a period that partly coincides with the increase in PMI prevalence, the supply of private facilities increased at a similar rate. Many of these new facilities were located in the south east of England. During this period, the number of private acute care hospitals in the UK increased by over 36% (from 150 to 205) and the number of private acute care beds by over 56% (from 6,671 to 10,433). 8 The total number of acute care beds in UK private acute care hospitals (10, 433) in 1989, was 8.5% of the number in England within the NHS (123,450 for 1988-1989) . 9 As of 1999 there were 10,351 independent acute medical/surgical hospital beds in the UK. 10 This is 9.7% of the number of NHS acute care beds in England at the time (107,218 in 1999-2000). 10 The Thatcher and Major Conservative governments, in power from 1979 to 1997, encouraged the growth of private hospitals. Rather than approve private hospitals on the basis of local health care needs, they made profitability the main criterion for development. 11 They also made it more attractive for NHS consultants to undertake private practice, and introduced tax incentives for both employer paid and individual private medical insurance plans. Premiums paid by employers on behalf of their employees were made tax deductible, as were premiums paid by low-paid workers for individual plans. Employers also did not pay employers' National Insurance contributions on PMI provided to employees as a benefit-in-kind. Additionally, in 1990, tax relief at the basic rate was provided to holders of individual private medical insurance over age 60. 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 * Decreases due to re-estimation of multiplier which converts subscribers to persons covered.
In August 1997, the Labour government ended tax relief for PMI premiums paid by those over the age of 60. 12 Other budgetary measures introduced by the Labour government likely to have an effect on demand for PMI are a rise in Insurance Premium Tax to 5% from 4% (introduced in October 1994 at an initial rate of 2.5% 13 ) and the extension of employer paid national insurance contributions to cover PMI benefits in kind from April 2000. 13 These changes were likely to be ideological and the result of evidence suggesting that incentives intended to increase PMI prevalence were expensive, and largely unsuccessful in stimulating demand. 14 In particular, rebates tend not to be self-financing largely because they benefit current PMI subscribers and do not encourage a sufficient number of new subscribers from whom the NHS would potentially realise savings. 14 The reduction in individual PMI coverage witnessed between 1996 and 2000 may be due to premium levels approaching the point beyond which consumers elect to discontinue cover. Individual PMI premiums are estimated to have increased by over 15% in the calendar year 1999 -around 5 times the rate of inflation during the same period. 15 In 2000, the average annual premium for an individual (including employee paid PMI) medical insurance policy was approximately £987 per subscriber and £592 per person covered (individual subscribers may pay for coverage which extends to one or more dependents). 5 Another factor may be the elimination of tax relief for those over age 60. This resulted in a 29.9% increase in premiums for individual subscribers over age 60 and has been attributed with reducing PMI prevalence in the over 60's from 9.2% to 8.8%. 14 With respect to the trend towards company paid PMI, this employment benefit is most prevalent in professional and managerial jobs and the service industry. Data from the 1987 General Household Survey was one of the first to show this trend. That data indicated that 34% of people aged 45-64 in professional occupations were covered by PMI, compared with only 3% of skilled manual workers. 16 This can also explain some of the regional variation in PMI uptake that has been observed in some studies. 17 Calnan et al noted from their analysis in 1991 that 20% of the population in the outer London Metropolitan area were covered but only 4% coverage existed in the north of England.
Current trends also suggest that company paid PMI plans are displacing some of the demand for individual policies. Two factors thought to impact on the prevalence of company paid plans are the underlying strength of corporate economic performance and the changing attitude of employers towards purchasing PMI for their employees. 13 If these conditions continue to exist, it is likely that demand for individually purchased PMI will continue to decline as more people will receive PMI through their employer and will not then seek individual PMI coverage.
It would appear that the shift towards company paid plans in the PMI market is also partly the result of a shift in emphasis by the insurers themselves. Strategic price discounting and increased concentration of marketing are also described as key factors for these increases. 13 The reason for this shift in emphasis may be that insurers perceive a greater capacity for premium growth in this sector of the market. Data from the past three years suggest that price increases in premiums are less likely to result in decreased demand in the company paid sector as compared to the individual sector. Estimates of elasticity of demand for company paid plans in the four years 1997, 1998, 1999 and 2000 were 1.40, 3.00, 0.56 and 1.42 respectively, while for individual plans the corresponding elasticities were -0.49, -0.91, -0.41 and -0.20. 5 However, the estimates for the company paid plans are likely a result of changes in factors other than price and demand (eg. corporate income), and thus not true indicators of price elasticity.
Also insurers may prefer to focus on employment-based group insurance as individuals in this market tend to be younger and healthier as compared to individual subscribers, 18 and therefore less likely to make claims. It is also worth noting that while the demand for private medical insurance in the UK is taken to represent demand for a service available free at the point of use for all members of the public, there are a few exceptions where insurance coverage includes treatment not provided or difficult to obtain within the NHS, such as dental care and alternative therapies. Conversely, chronic care, pre-existing conditions, GP services and accident and emergency care are available from the NHS, but are not covered by PMI.
Modelling the decision to purchase private medical insurance
Several factors impact on the decision to purchase private medical insurance. These include the individual's degree of risk aversion, premium costs, the perceived magnitude of a potential loss due to illness relative to income, and information concerning the likelihood that an illness will occur. 19, 20 Choice and convenience, as offered by a private health care alternative, are also benefits sought by PMI subscribers. 21, 22 In some cases quality of care available through private insurance, relative to that available through an NHS system, may also be an incentive.
The theory of insurance markets places a great significance on the concept of risk aversion. An individual is risk averse if he or she is willing to pay to guarantee certainty and avoid a potential loss of uncertain size. In a health system where services are publicly financed, care is typically provided free at the point of use. Thus no financial burden exists in accessing care. Patients may, however, seek to avoid uncertainty as to the waiting time for treatment. The nature of demand for PMI is therefore likely to be significantly different in a predominantly publicly financed system compared to a predominantly privately financed system. The potential financial loss of ill health in an NHS system is minimal relative to system that has little or no public financing.
Patients wishing to avoid the uncertainty that exists with waiting within the NHS must choose between purchasing PMI or paying for care out of pocket if and when ill health occurs. The decision to purchase PMI must occur prior to the need arising, however, as coverage will not be provided for pre-existing conditions.
The perception of NHS quality can relate to both the quality of clinical treatment and the quality of treatment related services. Clinical treatment in private facilities is unlikely to exceed that of the NHS as most physicians who work in the private sector also work simultaneously in the NHS. It is in the areas of choice and convenience that the NHS may be perceived to be weaker. PMI subscribers may have the option to choose the facility at which they receive treatment. They can also arrange to receive treatment in less time than required in the NHS, at a time of their choice, and in a facility with better 'hotel' services than typically available in the NHS.
Hall and Preston put forward two possible alternative explanations as to why individuals purchase private medical insurance. 23 The first is that there exist individuals who give health issues a high priority, possibly because they are more fearful of ill health. These individuals may be expected to prioritise increased public health spending over other public spending or the option of lower tax burdens, and are also more likely to purchase PMI to ensure access to treatment as necessary. The second possibility is that there may exist a shared political component to both the insured decision and to public attitudes. Individuals who are hostile to the state may be both more inclined to meet their own medical needs privately and disinclined to support increased health spending.
Of the types of characteristics impacting on demand for PMI, personal characteristics are the easiest to measure within a survey. Take, for example, age. An individual in the 35 to 64 year age group may consider PMI given his or her increasing likelihood of ill health. 24 An individual's age will also impact on their perceptions of the magnitude of a potential loss relative to their income, especially if approaching retirement and a resultant fixed income. Another relevant personal characteristic is self-employment. A self-employed individual is likely to desire immediate medical treatment to avoid a negative impact on income. 18 By focussing on the PMI purchase decision, net of demand and supply effects, we will be estimating what is known as a 'reduced-form' equation. Reduced-form equations show how the equilibrium values of the endogenous variables change as a function of the exogenous variables. 25 This approach limits us in being able to show the structure of causalities, however, and does not allow us to estimate the impact of specific factors on either side of the market. Attempting to estimate the full structural model would require identifying the demand and supply functions separately in two independent models. This would require identifying exogenous variables that relate exclusively to either changes in demand or supply. The nature of the private medical insurance market makes this task very difficult due to the fact that many effects are likely to simultaneously impact on demand and supply. a Previous studies in this area have referred to determinants of demand for PMI, but in fact have estimated reduced-form models, incorporating factors that potentially impact on both demand and supply. Take for example the effect of income. Income is likely to impact on both demand and supply of PMI. An increase in income may bring about a shift in demand for PMI. Conversely, insurers may aim to appeal to subscribers in higher income groups.
Consider Figure 2 below. At an initial point in time (time 1), the equilibrium quantity of PMI will be q 1 which is the intersection of the demand function at time 1 (D 1 ) and the supply function at time 1 (S 1 ). The likely effect of an increase in income for a particular respondent will be a shift outwards in demand (D 2 ). That is, at each price, a greater demand for PMI will a Structural models would also require information on price and cover for each respondent. likely exist. If we consider the effects on demand only, we may expect a new equilibrium at the volume of q d . However, there is likely to be a concurrent increase in supply as insurers seek to gain new business from individuals (and employers on behalf of their employees) who are in high-income groups. This is represented in the figure as the supply curve S 2 . The difficulty is that at the new equilibrium quantity (or prevalence) of PMI, q o1 , it is difficult to disentangle the contribution of the shift in demand from the shift in supply.
In mathematical terms, the demand and supply functions, D 1 and S 1 respectively, can be represented by the equations:
where P is the price paid for PMI cover, X and Y are other factors that influence demand and supply respectively, and W is the effect of waiting times.
Note that, other things being equal, the effect of price on the quantity demanded is negative. That is, demand for PMI is likely to decrease as price increases. Other factors considered here may have significant demand and supply effects and yet show a non-significant overall effect. Consider the effect of deterioration in health. Demand for PMI would likely increase as a result, but insurers would supply less in an attempt to exclude poor risks. In the figure this is represented by a shift to the left in the supply curve. The equilibrium quantity supplied in this case is q o2 , which is less than the quantity demanded if we only consider the demand effect of poorer health (q d ). When modelling these effects, nonsignificant results may occur if demand and supply effects cancel each other out.
In addition to health status, conflicting impacts on demand and supply of PMI could be a factor with other individual characteristics such as age and employment status. Insurers adjust premiums based on age, and the availability of PMI cover at a given price will be significantly curtailed the older the insuree. With respect to employment status, insurance companies may avoid risks if they feel the insuree may be unable to pay the premium.
Evidence from empirical studies
Previous empirical studies have examined the associations between personal characteristics and prevalence of PMI. Also considered are indices of NHS quality, most often waiting times, and attitudes to the public and private sector. Other analyses of PMI demand have examined the importance placed on choice and convenience by the public, the level of worry over health, attitudes towards risk and towards the public and private sectors. Table 1 provides a summary of previous studies in this area.
Age, income and education have repeatedly been found to be positively associated with the demand for PMI. 15, 22, 26, 27, 28 Propper (1989) also found a significant association between employment status and having PMI. Those in work and with a spouse in work were significantly more likely to have PMI. Other personal characteristics such as socio-economic status, self-employment and home ownership, were not found to be statistically significant in this study though Besley et al (1993) and Emerson et al (2001) found the latter to be significantly associated with PMI coverage and Bosanquet and Pollard (1997) reported that those in social classes A and B were more likely to be covered by PMI. Emerson et al (2001) observed in their study that self-employed individuals were less likely to hold PMI. Bosanquet and Pollard (1997) found that men were more likely to be covered by PMI than women and Conservative party supporters were more likely to be covered than Labour supporters. The other studies to test these effects, Emerson et al (2001) and Besley et al (1999) respectively, arrived at similar results. Besley et al (1993) and Emerson et al (2001) found a significant negative association between the number of children in a household and prevalence of PMI. That is, respondents from households where there were a relatively high number of children were less likely to hold PMI coverage.
Some focus has been placed on health status and it's impact on demand for PMI. Propper (1989 and 1993) included indices of health status in her analysis, but this was not found to achieve statistical significance. The indices used included having reported a chronic illness, having had an inpatient stay in the past year, having had an outpatient stay in the past year, and having had a GP visit in the previous 2 weeks. The lack of an association between health status and PMI coverage may reflect the fact that future expected health is a greater determinant of PMI purchase than current health, though empirical evidence also suggests that being a smoker does not increase or decrease the likelihood of having PMI coverage. Propper (1993) did find that poor health of a spouse was associated with having PMI coverage.
Various indices have been employed to represent aspects of NHS quality relative to private treatment. NHS quality may be reflected in waiting times. Besley et al (1999) and Propper (1999) did not find a positive association between the number of individuals in the respondent's region waiting for inpatient care and the likelihood of having PMI coverage. Besley et al (1999) did observe that in regions where those waiting over 12 months for inpatient care was relatively high, there were significantly more PMI subscribers.
In 1991, a questionnaire survey of private hospital patients was conducted in the Wessex regional health authority to determine their reasons for using private health care services. 29 NHS waiting lists are the most common reason given. Interestingly, however, the respondents were unaware of how long the waiting list had been. And while the majority of respondents had made a decision about using private health care before consulting with their GP, they tended to be influenced by their GPs advice on the choice of consultant and choice of hospital. Calnan et al. (1993) report a similar finding on the significance of NHS GP advice.
Waiting times do not necessarily reflect NHS quality with regards to efficiency. Calnan et al (1993) observed that regional based waiting lists were not related to the number of patients treated across regions. This is not to say that the effect of waiting is not important, but rather that the impact of waiting should be considered in addition to a proxy for NHS quality, if such a measure can be derived. Qualitative data from Calnan et al (1993) suggests that respondents do make this distinction. They did not identify quality distinctions between private and NHS services, but did express concern over waiting times. Propper et al (2001) considered the number of private hospitals (deflated by population size) as an index of private sector capacity in a recent analysis of the demand for PMI and found them to be statistically significant. 30 The use of this index assumes a comparable number of beds in each facility. This may not be the case, however, as private hospital capacities vary considerably in size. Bosanquet and Pollard (1997) found that respondents commonly identified choice and convenience as reasons for having PMI. Thirty-seven %identified the swiftness of receiving treatment as an advantage of PMI, 26% mentioned the ability to choose when to be treated, and 23% liked the ease with which consultations may be arranged with PMI coverage. Propper ( i. 'Lives alone' was not considered, but income variable is based on household income; also the number of adults in household is considered.
ii. Also, age cohort is significant at p<0.05 and positively related to demand for PMI. ie. Those in a particular age group at a later point in time are more likely to purchase PMI than those of the same age group at an earlier point in time.
iii. Variables found to be significant in separate models include the interaction of NHS and a dummy variable reflecting the post 1991 reform period, the interaction of number of part time consultants and the post-1991 dummy variable, and the interaction of the number of private hospitals and the post-1991 dummy variable. iv. Partner's age also statistically significant. Propper (1993) included indices of the level of worry over health and attitude to risk in her analysis of demand for PMI and found the latter to be significantly associated with demand for PMI. Respondents who said they would avoid paying for private care at the point of demand were more likely to have PMI coverage. Also included in this study was an index of attitude to the private sector, found not to be associated with PMI coverage. Besley et al (1999) included an index of attitude to the public sector in their analysis and found a negative association between this variable and having PMI coverage.
Some consistent findings are apparent, though some inconsistencies exist. Though the studies vary in their methodology, there is overwhelming evidence that high socio-economic status is associated with increased demand for PMI. Amongst personal characteristics, increased age (especially being between age 40 and 60), high income, high educational achievement and non-manual employment are associated with increased demand for PMI. Also, the importance of disposable income is evident from the significance of living with a partner, living without children and living in owner-occupied housing. As disposable income increases, the ratio price to income decreases. This allows for greater quantity to be demanded at any given price.
Results examining the impact of NHS waiting times are inconsistent, as are other indices of NHS quality. The impact of political preference is determined to be significant in some studies, but not significant in others. And a link between being self-employed and having PMI is not unanimous.
Developing hypotheses and research questions
Based on theory and available empirical evidence, the PMI purchase decision would appear to be based on several multifaceted determinants. One significant factor is an individual's economic means. Unless their disposable income allows such a purchase, individuals and families are likely to forego PMI as compared to more fundamental needs such as food and shelter. Employment based PMI also reflects economic means as it is most often high paid workers who are given PMI by their employers. The importance of disposable income can be judged by assessing the effects of proxies such as individual income, type of employment, and whether respondents live with a spouse or partner, on PMI coverage. Premium costs will also impact on PMI prevalence. The increase in premiums in the individual PMI market, and the concurrent decline in the prevalence of individual PMI coverage, reflects this fact.
A significant association between age and PMI demand may reflect an individual's perception of their potential exposure to illness. In particular, an individual approaching old age, who has enjoyed good health and for whom the cost of PMI coverage is manageable, is likely to emphasise the positive aspect of having PMI coverage (increasing health care needs, choice and convenience) in weighing up the decision of whether or not to purchase private medical insurance. These factors will have to be weighed against the relatively high premiums that are required to obtain cover.
Due to the increasing prevalence of employer paid PMI in certain employment sectors, it is likely that employment related factors such as income and type of job will have a diminishing impact on individual PMI demand. This is likely to occur, as a significant number of individuals who would have considered PMI coverage are increasingly likely to receive it as a benefit from their employer. Not much is known about the criteria that impact on the purchase decision of employers, though the competitiveness of benefit packages in certain employment sectors, and the ability to reduce potential lost productivity due to ill health of employees may be driving the growth in employer paid PMI.
As previously noted, risk aversion is linked to perceptions of the risk of delay in accessing medical treatment in the NHS. Perceptions of delay, in turn, are likely based on media reports and GP advice on waiting times. Measuring risk aversion is difficult, however. At best, surveys are able to measure factors that contribute to uncertainty and the potential for loss. We have used NHS waiting times as a proxy to represent the degree of uncertainty that patients may face. By including these data, we attempted to measure a potentially key influencing factor on the perception of risk with regards to medical care. Waiting times may also impact of the supply of PMI. Insurers are likely to target geographical areas where they know waiting times are relatively high.
Uncertainty is only one aspect of NHS performance that may influence demand for PMI, however. Quality, in terms of health outcomes and facilities, and patient experiences are other important factors. The impact of waiting times may not have an immediate effect on demand, and one would expect a gap in time during which aversion to a potential delay in seeking medical services increased to the point where the decision to purchase PMI was made. We hypothesise that the association between waiting times and demand for PMI is strongest when this delayed effect is accounted for.
Other supply-side factors may also be relevant. While the survey data does not indicate whether or not respondents are aware of the accessible private facilities in their area, data on their prevalence can be used to indicate the likely impact they have in the decision by individuals to purchase PMI coverage. The relative significance of individual awareness of accessible facilities versus their actual prevalence may be minor if the individual is reliant on their GP for advice with regards to the merits of the private versus the public sector.
The theory and empirical evidence on the PMI purchase decision suggests research questions relating to the impact of personal characteristics such as income, employment status, age and attitude to the private sector, along with premium costs, risk aversion, NHS performance and the prevalence of private facilities.
The available data from the BHPS are suitable for examining some of these questions but not others. Where relevant data exist we have specified hypotheses that will be tested. These are:
1) Having individually financed PMI coverage is primarily dependent on having a disposable income that allows one to cover premium costs.
2) The prevalence of individually financed PMI coverage is higher amongst individuals in older age groups because increasing age is likely to be related to increasing aversion to risk.
3) Individuals who identify themselves as politically Conservative are more likely to subscribe to PMI. This ideology is in line with a positive attitude towards the private sector.
4) The prevalence of employer financed PMI is likely to be related to employment factors that indicate managerial or service based employment. 5) NHS waiting times are one aspect of perceived NHS quality that may impact on the purchase decision. The effect of waiting times is more likely to be observed if one allows for a time lag between waiting times information reaching the public and the associated demand for PMI being observed.
6) The prevalence of private beds and physicians on maximum part-time or part-time contracts impacts upon the prevalence of PMI.
7) The removal of the tax subsidy to PMI subscribers over the age of 60 has had a significant impact on the prevalence of PMI amongst this age group. 8) Individual PMI subscribers who gave up their PMI cover subsequent to the removal of the tax subsidy were likely to be paying a higher premium and thus more likely to be effected by the loss of the subsidy.
We are unable to draw direct conclusions from the data on other aspects of the research questions, such as the effect of risk aversion and attitudes towards the public and private sectors, due to the fact that the available data are not amenable to examining these specific topics. But in some cases, proxy data, such as age as a proxy of risk aversion, may be used to gain some insight into the nature of their relationship to the PMI purchase decision.
Methods
The The initial selection of households for inclusion in the panel survey was made using a twostage clustered probability design and systematic sampling. 31 Interviews were attempted at all private households found at these addresses. All individuals enumerated in respondent households became part of the longitudinal sample. The sample for the subsequent waves consists of all individuals over age 15 in all households containing at least one member who was resident in a household interviewed at Wave One. Further information on the sampling and survey design is available from the BHPS Online documentation. 29 Three questions in the BHPS describe private medical insurance coverage. Respondents are asked if they are covered by private medical insurance, how the insurance is paid for (if they are covered), and what is the cost to the respondent of the medical insurance. We also identified several possible determinants of medical insurance prevalence from the BHPS. These include age, educational achievement, income, area of residence, whether the respondent is in paid employment, political party supported, sex, self-reported health status, whether the respondent smokes, whether the respondent lives alone or with a partner and whether or not there are children living in the respondent's household.
There are limitations in the use of the BHPS dataset, however. While the survey exceeds other large surveys in the number of questions relating to PMI coverage, it was not designed for this purpose specifically and thus omits some relevant information. In particular, data on premium costs are only available for individual subscribers. Ideally, premium cost data would also be available for individuals with a company plan, along with the premium they would be likely to pay if they had chosen to insure individually.
Also useful would be data on the extent of PMI cover. Each PMI plan will offer different levels of and options for treatment. Unfortunately, this information is also not available from the BHPS questionnaire. And limited data on out-of-pocket payments exists. Less than 4% of BHPS respondents without PMI who had a private hospital inpatient stay or visited a private consultant or specialist paid for these services out-of-pocket. This rate is lower than other estimates of the prevalence of out-of-pocket payments. 32 Comparing PMI subscribers with out-of-pocket health purchasers would be an interesting exercise, but giving the apparent low prevalence of the latter group in the BHPS data, the results may be misleading.
Of the variables included in our analyses, perhaps the most problematic is income. Survey questions relating to income are often met with reserve, due to concerns about confidentiality and how the information will be used. 33 Also, income data may misrepresent financial welfare as it does not take into account family size and geographic differences in the cost of living, 34 and typically does not include investment income. 35 These problems are not specific to the BHPS, however. The b The indices employed were the percentage of patients who waited over 6 months for an inpatient stay and the percentage of patients who waited over 13 weeks for an outpatient appointment. While it is true that waiting lists and waiting times would not necessarily be consistent within a health authority, and thus would not influence individuals within a health authority identically, this seemed the most appropriate way to take account of the extent to which respondents were influenced by the level of wait encountered in the NHS. Sensitivity analysis incorporating data on waiting times aggregated at the regional level was also conducted to determine the extent to which the unit of aggregation of waiting times data influenced the results. Finally, because variations exist in how waiting lists are determined in England, Scotland and Wales, we restricted our analysis to residents of England.
We obtained data on the supply of private beds, at the regional level, in 1997. 36 Within much of England, the distribution of private facilities is such that the population will not have access to more than one facility. This is not the case in London and the South East, however, where the concentration of facilities is relatively high. For this reason, we used the wider regional level to assign access to private beds to respondents. The number of private acute medical and surgical beds per 100,000 population was calculated for each region and linked to individual respondents. 37 a Disposable income reflects the actual access to financial means of an individual or household that could be spent on insurance premiums. Also, it can incorporate sources of income outside of salaries and wages. It does not, however, negate concerns for confidentiality. b Inpatient waiting times data is population based and includes ordinary admissions and day case waiting lists for every Health Authority (HA) in England averaged over the calendar year. Outpatient waiting times data is also population based and includes details for first outpatient appointments for each Health Authority (HA) in England averaged over the calendar year.
Additionally, we sought to examine the effect of the regional distribution of physicians working in the private sector. To approximate this data we included the number of NHS physicians working under maximum part-time and part-time contracts per 100,000 population in each of the eight regions in England as of September 2000. b This data may not accurately reflect the number of physicians working privately, however, as many physicians may be working part-time in the NHS to allow for time to utilise in ways other than working privately.
We also included in the analyses the effect of the distribution of surgeons working under maximum part-time and part-time contracts per 100,000 population as of September 2000. The distribution of surgeons across contract type varies considerably from that of consultant physicians overall, with a greater proportion of them working under maximum part-time contracts. Based on Department of Health data taken in September 2000, 26.7% of consultant physicians were working under maximum part-time contracts, while within the surgical group the corresponding percentage was 43.9%. 38 The BHPS data differentiates between PMI holders according to how premiums are financed. It is possible to differentiate between those individuals who purchase PMI individually, and those who receive PMI as an employment benefit for which they do not pay at all.
Some individuals report being covered under a policy in a family member's name. It is not always clear from the data, however, if the person under whose name they receive coverage has paid the insurance premiums individually or through an employment-based plan. As such, respondents covered by a family member's coverage are excluded from our analysis.
Some individuals pay part of the premium for employment-based group coverage. Some of these individuals would be in a position to choose whether or not to subscribe, given that the premiums are coming out of their earnings. Thus, they are expressing demand for PMI. We can also assume, however, that the premiums they pay as part of a group plan are less than that which they would have encountered had they purchased individually. So while some may have purchased PMI regardless, some may have chosen not to purchase PMI if they had been faced with a higher premium. Due to the variability in the circumstances likely within this subgroup, we chose to exclude them from the analyses.
The data are first modelled assuming a multinomial distribution for the 1997-1999 BHPS data (model 1). By so doing, the purchase decision of the individual subscriber and the employee-paid group subscriber can be analysed as separate groups. Both groups are compared to non-PMI holders. Data for 1996 is not included due to the unavailability of outpatient waiting times, at the health authority level, for this year. In the case that data for a particular respondent was not available for one of the years considered, the model allowed for inclusion of data for those years that were available.
In the multinomial logit model, we are interested in estimating three sets of coefficients β 1 , β 2 , β 3 . If we set one set, e.g. β 3 to zero, this allows the remaining coefficients β 1 and β 2 to be interpreted as the change relative to the y = 3 group. Setting β 3 = 0, the probability outcome equations are: 40 b Part-time is used here to refer to contracts. Consultants on maximum part-time contracts receive 10/11 of the full NHS salary and are not subject to a limit on their private earnings. Herein, we refer to private physicians and private surgeons to refer to physicians and surgeons on maximum part-time and part-time contracts.
The relative probability of y = 2 to the base category y = 3 is:
This ratio is the relative risk.
If we then assume that X and β k (2) are vectors equal to (x 1 , x 2 ,..., x k ) and (β 1 (2) , β 2 (2) ,..., β k
)', respectively, then the ratio of the relative risk for a one-unit change in x i is then: 40 Therefore, the exponentiated value of a coefficient is the relative 'risk' ratio, or relative likelihood, for a one-unit change in the corresponding variable, where 'risk' is measured relative to the base category. The statistical package STATA estimates the marginal significance level of each term in the model (that is, the significance level of each effect over and above that observed from the other effects in the model). 39 The relative magnitudes of the most significant effects are represented graphically. A hypothetical combination of factors was chosen and the predicted probability of an individual with these characteristics having individually purchased PMI was calculated. Each factor was then altered in turn to illustrate the relative effects of each.
The panel nature of the data allows for consideration of lagged effects. Because the effect of NHS waiting times may not have an immediate impact on the insurance purchase decision, models were considered in which NHS waiting times data from 1997 and 1998 were included in a cross-sectional multinomial logit analysis of the 1998 and 1999 BHPS data (model 2).
In all the models we deemed p-values below 0.05 to indicate statistical significant associations. 
Results
The 1996 sample of the British Household Panel Survey includes 8,125 individuals who reside in England. In the years 1997, 1998 and 1999 the sample lost 7.6%, 8.0% and 8.0% respondents respectively. The overall sample increased, however, to a size of 9,197 individuals in 1999. This is the result of additional individuals being included in the sample as individuals come to share a household with an original sample member. The analysis includes respondents with data for those years that they were part of the overall sample.
The 1999 sample includes of 435 individuals who have individually purchased PMI (4.7% of sample), 110 who are part of a company PMI plan in which the premium is deducted from their salary (1.2%), 491 who receive PMI as a benefit from their employer (5.3%) and 466 who are covered by a plan held by a family member (5.1%). Of those covered by a family member, 66.0% had another respondent within their household who had PMI in their own name. Of these, 37.7% paid for coverage directly, 13.8% had the premiums deducted from their salary, and 48.1% had the premiums fully paid by their employer. Distributions of the explanatory variables appear in Appendix B, tables 1, 2 and 3.
The average age (40.6 years) of those receiving PMI as an employer provided benefit was lower than in any of the other subgroups. They also had higher incomes. The average monthly income for an individual receiving PMI as a benefit from their employer was £2,432, while individual subscribers earned on average £1,661 per month and respondents without PMI earned £932 on average. A similar proportion of those receiving PMI as a benefit, and those who had company-based PMI for which they paid all or part of the premium were women (29.9% and 30.9% respectively). Approximately 55% of those without PMI were women, and in the subgroup of individuals who were covered by a family member, 3 out of 4 were women. These comparisons are shown in Table 2 .
As described above, the first model compared those with individually purchased PMI and those with employer paid PMI with those without PMI cover. Data from the three-year period 1997-1999 was used in this analysis. In the comparison of individual subscribers with nonsubscribers, the results of the multivariate analysis deemed statistically significant determinants of PMI prevalence to be education, income, sex, age, being in good health (self reported), political preference, the supply of private surgeons, and living in a household with children. Table 3a reports these results. Positive coefficients indicate a positive relationship with PMI prevalence. With respect to education, those with education above O-level attainment were more likely to have PMI relative to those without this level of education. Income and age illustrate effects that change at different points in their distribution. This is reflected in the significance of both linear and squared terms for these variables. Conservative voters and men are more likely than other voters and women respectively, to have PMI. Also, those living in a household with one or more children are less likely to have PMI. Finally, there exists an increased prevalence of PMI in regions where the number of surgeons on parttime NHS contracts, is relatively high. This is assumed to reflect an association between the supply of surgeons working privately and the prevalence of individually purchased PMI.
The effects of being in paid work, being in average health (relative to poor health) and being a non-smoker all show a trend towards a greater likelihood of having PMI. This is reflected in their p-values approaching statistical significance. Figure 3 illustrates the relative magnitude of these effects. Model 1 predicts that a man, aged 45, with higher education qualifications, in good health, with 1 or more children in his household, an income of £1,500 per month and who expressed support for the Labour party would have individually purchased PMI in approximately 9 cases out of 100. Altering only political preference in this hypothetical case, we find that a Conservative supporter with all other characteristics remaining the same, would have a 17 in 100 likelihood of having individually purchased PMI.
Predicted probabilities
In the comparison of those receiving PMI as a fully paid benefit from their employer and non-subscribers, the significant determinants are education, being in paid work, income, job stature, sex, age, health status, being a non-smoker, political preference, supply of private surgeons in the region, living with a spouse or partner and living with children (see Table 3b ).
As in the previous model, the effects of income and age are non-linear.
With respect to education, those with A-level qualifications are significantly more likely to have employer paid PMI than those without O-level qualifications. Those in professional or managerial occupations were more likely to have employer paid PMI than the unskilled and unemployed. c These effects do not exhibit a continuum along levels of education and job status and PMI cover, however. That is, a non-significant result was observed in the comparison of those with higher qualifications and those without O-levels, despite the significance of A-level qualifications.
Employer paid PMI is significantly more prevalent amongst men, those in good health, nonsmokers, Conservative voters and those living with a spouse or partner. It is significantly less prevalent amongst those living in a household with children. And as the prevalence of private surgeons in the respondents region of residence increases, so too does the prevalence of employer paid PMI.
The relative magnitudes of a sample of effects are shown in Figure 4 . Here the base case is a male, aged 45, non-smoker, living with a spouse or partner, with an income of £1,500 per month, having A-level academic qualifications, working as a professional or manager and a Labour supporter. The probability that an individual with this combination of factors will have employer paid PMI is 0.17. The effect of an individual with similar characteristics working in unskilled labour is a reduction in the probability of having employer paid PMI to approximately 0.03.
Model 2 accounted for the potential lag between information on waiting times to influence the decision of individual to purchase PMI (see Tables 4a and 4b ). The results suggest that there was a trend for the individual PMI purchase decision to be associated with the length of outpatient waiting times in the local health authority (p=0.059). In this model all the parameters found to be significant in the previous model retain a positive significant association, with similar coefficients, apart from living in a household with children and the regional supply of private surgeons.
Waiting times are not found to be significant to the purchase decision for employer-paid PMI. Additionally, the 2 year model with lagged waiting times exhibits less significant effects than the model with 3 years (unlagged) data. This is not unexpected however, as the strength of the model will be enhanced with more observations. Several effects are not observed as significant when using only 2 years of data: job status, being in paid work, age, living with a spouse or partner and living with a child. In each case, however, the direction of the effect is consistent to that observed in the model with 3 years of data.
Sensitivity analysis that considered the effect of aggregating waiting times data at the regional level produced results that were consistent with the use of health authority based waiting times data.
Analysis of the BHPS data suggests that the removal of the tax subsidy to PMI subscribers over age 60 did not result in a withdrawal from PMI coverage within this age group that was significantly different from the overall dropout rate. Looking at the overall sample, the percentage of individual subscribers who gave up their coverage in the years 1997, 1998 and 1999 were 23.7%, 20.0% and 24.9% respectively. Within the over 60 sub sample, the corresponding dropout rates were 25.9%, 17.6% and 24.2%. What is apparent, however, was that in each year during this period, the ratio of new individual subscribers to withdrawals was lower within the over 60 sub sample than in the overall sample. In the overall sample in 1997, new subscribers exceeded withdrawals by 12%, while amongst those over 60 there were 39% fewer new subscribers than withdrawals. In 1998, the number of new subscribers exceeded the number of withdrawals by 33% in the overall sample and by 14% in the over 60 sub sample. In 1999, there were 17% fewer new subscribers than withdrawals in the overall sample, while in the over 60 sub sample, there were 61% fewer new subscribers than withdrawals.
Among all age groups, those who withdrew from individual PMI coverage during the 1997-1999 period reported significantly lower premium costs than those who maintained their coverage (£20.49/month compared to £36.17/month, 1997-1999 data combined). d This pattern also existed within the over 60 age group. Also, regardless of age, those who withdrew from coverage had statistically significantly lower incomes than those who maintained their PMI coverage (£1,267/month compared to £1,991/month overall and £707/month compared to £1,296/month amongst the over 60s).
Discussion
As with other studies, the association between each of income, age, level of education and the prevalence of individual PMI is evident. 24, 25 A possible conclusion to be drawn from this result is that these factors are all linked to disposable income and significantly impact on the ability to purchase PMI. The lower prevalence of PMI in households with children supports this conclusion [Hypothesis 1].
Some of these associations may have alternative explanations, however. The effect of age supports the hypothesis of demand resulting from risk aversion. It is expected that risk aversion increases with age, though the non-linear association with PMI suggests this relationship is more apparent at certain age ranges than at others. High educational d The 1999 average premium cost for individual subscribers reported in the BHPS is £574. This is significantly less than the £852 average subscription income per subscriber reported in Laing and Buisson's 2001 Private Medical Insurance -UK Market Sector Report. One possible explanation for this is that in the BHPS question on premium costs states that if the insurance is in joint names, the respondent should give only their share of the contribution. achievement may relate to greater support for prioritisation of health issues, and may also reflect a desire for greater individual responsibility [Hypothesis 2].
Political affiliation does appear to be significant in the PMI purchase decision. Our analysis shows that over the three years of data, a significant association exists between having support for the Conservative party and having PMI coverage -both in the individual and company paid PMI markets [Hypothesis 3].
The finding of a significantly greater number of men having individually purchased PMI is in line with results from previous studies. Besley et al (1999) also observed a greater proportion of women having no insurance as compared to men amongst individual or company-plan PMI subscribers. This association is not accountable by differences in income as the model calculates the marginal significance of each term.
Employment related factors do appear to be significant in the employer financed PMI market. Strong associations were observed with income and employment in professional or managerial positions. Also, the greater prevalence of employer financed PMI amongst men is consistent with the gender imbalance in managerial and service industries. Many other demographic factors were also significant, however, suggesting other potential conclusions are likely to exist regarding demographics in this sector of the PMI market [Hypothesis 4].
Our finding of an association between smoking and a lesser likelihood of having PMI differs with Propper's (1989) finding that smoking was not significantly associated with PMI coverage.
To date, conflicting results have been observed with respect to an association between the perceived quality of the NHS and demand for PMI. Our analysis finds no statistically significant associations between either inpatient or outpatient waiting times and having PMI. We did observe a trend towards a greater prevalence of individually financed PMI the higher the observed outpatient waiting times from the previous year. The lack of an association between current waiting times and PMI prevalence is consistent with the findings of Propper et al (2001) . Besley et al (1999) observed an association between waiting times and demand for PMI amongst those with employer provided PMI.
It is possible that the effect of current waiting times is not specific to the wait in an individual's local health authority, but is a function of recent media reports on waiting times, which, for the most part, are referenced in the media on a national basis. Thus the perception of the waiting list problem is likely of more relevance than the actual experiences. If this is true, negative press reports on the NHS are likely to stimulate a demand for PMI, 40 and explain the significant lagged effect that we observed. Also of importance is the influence of GPs who will have information on waiting times [Hypothesis 5].
Results from our analysis of supply-side factors suggest that prevalence of private surgeons is associated with higher PMI prevalence. This result is consistent with the finding by Propper et al (2001) that the supply of private hospitals and part-time physicians is significantly associated with having PMI coverage [Hypothesis 6].
The withdrawal of the tax subsidy for PMI subscribers over the age of 60 appears to have had the effect of discouraging potential subscribers in this age group, though the rate of withdrawal from PMI amongst the over 60s was not higher than the overall sample. This result deviates from our hypothesis. The ability to delineate the effect of the removal of the tax subsidy on PMI withdrawals may be hampered by the fact that concurrent to this change were premium increases for all subscribers. Despite this we speculate that the lack of a greater proportion of withdrawals amongst subscribers over age 60 may be due to greater likelihood of utilising health services. That is, the over 60's are likely to place a greater value on their PMI cover than younger subscribers [Hypothesis 7].
Our final hypothesis was also not born out by our analysis of the data. Those who withdrew from individual PMI reported lower premium costs and lower incomes than those who maintained their coverage. This suggests that those who withdrew may have been receiving less comprehensive coverage, and thus more inclined to withdraw from coverage as premiums increased. Another possible explanation is that those with relatively high incomes were less influenced by the increases in premiums observed over this period [Hypothesis 8].
Conclusion
The findings reported here expand upon previous studies using data specific to the decision to purchase private medical insurance. The British Household Panel Survey is suitable for analyses of the associations between the personal characteristics and situational circumstances of individuals and PMI insurance coverage. Individual respondents are followed over time, and thus changes that take place over time, such as insurance status and health status, are incorporated in the analysis of associations between the independent variables and PMI coverage. The analyses are further enhanced by linking in NHS waiting times data and data on the supply of private hospital beds and physicians working in the private sector.
Current trends in the PMI market suggest that, over time, individually purchased private medical insurance is likely to be partially displaced by PMI purchased as part of a companybased plan. The key factors in having company-based, employer paid insurance appear to relate to income and type of employment. Because the typical subscriber in a company-based, employer paid plan is younger, the growth of these plans may shift private sector resources away from the types of services required by the elderly, in particular, acute care. 41 One potential area for further research is to determine the factors most important to employers in providing PMI to their employees.
Our results support the conclusion that income, age and political affiliation are key determinants of PMI prevalence as these variables repeatedly exhibit statistical significance in analyses. Further analysis, that incorporates premium costs for all subscribers, as well as the extent of PMI coverage for each individual and their perceptions of the quality of private health care relative to the NHS, is necessary to determine accurate estimates of the magnitude of these effects.
The results suggest that the analysis of the effect of waiting times may become clearer when a longer stream of data becomes available. It is likely that individuals reflect on information with regards to waiting times in deciding whether or not to purchase PMI cover.
The prevalence of private services appears to have some bearing on the decision to pay for PMI cover. Improvements in the data availability must be made to obtain a clearer picture of this effect. Ideal information would allow for each individual, or their GP, to assess the availability of private care beds to which they have access. This data, along with a lengthier panel of data from the BHPS will give clearer information on the PMI purchase decision. 
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